- Joined
- Jan 22, 2022
- Messages
- 13
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- 1
I support 3cx for myself and a few clients. I've worked with a 3cx partner on a variety of issues who makes tickets with 3cx on behalf of us. I'm not going to give details on the current issue we are working on, but I wanted to voice my concern and maybe vent a little bit about an issue we have encountered on multiple occasions.
I would make the claim that the firewall checker in it's current form, is bad security practice. Especially when combined with your support departments near refusal to troubleshoot any issues related or not until the 3cx install passes the check. The tool pretty much requires all ports that 3cx could conceivably use to be open, regardless of if the services you are currently using depend on them. I understand the point of having a tool like this, inevitably your phone support will handle mostly very basic calls, created by customers with minimal knowledge, and handled by tier 1 support that also have minimal knowledge. I get it. And yes, sip is an awkward protocol with differing requirements based on the sip trunk vendor and configuration. But at the same time, if the firewall checker is recommending every possibly used port open, and your support department demands this before they even read the ticket, you are in effect advocating for the widest attack surface possible. Sure you can open things up to 3cx specifically, temporarily, to pass the check, but I'm willing to bet most of your clients when faced with this just open everything recommended up and call it good. On top of this the local nftables ruleset is basic, and does not adapt to actual requirements of the system. Another issue this perpetuates is that most of your support engineers don't really understand what ports are required when. If the tooling on this were improved, your own support staff would be able to get issues resolved more quickly and customers would trend toward more sane firewall rulesets.
I would make the claim that the firewall checker in it's current form, is bad security practice. Especially when combined with your support departments near refusal to troubleshoot any issues related or not until the 3cx install passes the check. The tool pretty much requires all ports that 3cx could conceivably use to be open, regardless of if the services you are currently using depend on them. I understand the point of having a tool like this, inevitably your phone support will handle mostly very basic calls, created by customers with minimal knowledge, and handled by tier 1 support that also have minimal knowledge. I get it. And yes, sip is an awkward protocol with differing requirements based on the sip trunk vendor and configuration. But at the same time, if the firewall checker is recommending every possibly used port open, and your support department demands this before they even read the ticket, you are in effect advocating for the widest attack surface possible. Sure you can open things up to 3cx specifically, temporarily, to pass the check, but I'm willing to bet most of your clients when faced with this just open everything recommended up and call it good. On top of this the local nftables ruleset is basic, and does not adapt to actual requirements of the system. Another issue this perpetuates is that most of your support engineers don't really understand what ports are required when. If the tooling on this were improved, your own support staff would be able to get issues resolved more quickly and customers would trend toward more sane firewall rulesets.
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